Ethereum This is why EIP 1559 is good- and why Vitalik, developers and most community members support it. If miners have a problem with it, then please argue your case in a livestream with the actual researchers and developers. I'll bring the popcorn.

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• This is why EIP 1559 is good- and why Vitalik, developers and most community members support it. If miners have a problem with it, then please argue your case in a livestream with the actual researchers and developers. I'll bring the popcorn.
• Here on Valentine's day wishing EIP-1559 goes through seamlessly ��
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• A Theory of Ethereum State Size Management
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• On Ethereum's Dominance - Consolidated Common Content from Contributors
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This is why EIP 1559 is good- and why Vitalik, developers and most community members support it. If miners have a problem with it, then please argue your case in a livestream with the actual researchers and developers. I'll bring the popcorn. Posted: 14 Feb 2021 04:51 PM PST What is EIP 1559 EIP 1559 is a proposal to reform the Ethereum fee market, with the following key changes: The current gas limit of 10 million is replaced by two values: a "long-term average target" (10 million), and a "hard per-block cap" (20 million) There is a BASEFEE (which is burned) which transactions are required to pay, which gets adjusted on a block-by-block basis with the goal of targeting a value so that average block gas usage remains around 10 million. Essentially, instead of all of the short-term volatility in demand for transaction space within a block translating into volatility in transaction fees, some of the volatility instead translates into volatility in block size. Why is EIP 1559 good? Copying from an older post: There are three major problems with the status quo of transaction fee markets: Mismatch between volatility of transaction fee levels and social cost of transactions: transaction fees on mature public blockchains, that have enough usage so that blocks are full, tend to be extremely volatile. On Ethereum, minimum fees are typically around 2 gwei (109 gwei = 1 ETH), but sometimes go up to 20-50 gwei and have even on one occasion gone up to over 200 gwei: https://etherscan.io/chart/gasprice. This clearly creates many inefficiencies, because it's absurd to suggest that the cost incurred by the network from accepting one more transaction into a block actually is 100x more when gas prices are 200 gwei than when they are 2 gwei; in both cases, it's a difference between 8 million gas and 8.02 million gas. Inefficiencies of first price auctions: see https://ethresear.ch/t/first-and-second-price-auctions-and-improved-transaction-fee-markets/2410 for a detailed writeup. In short, the current approach, where transaction senders publish a transaction with a fee, miners choose the highest-paying transactions, and everyone pays what they bid, is well-known in mechanism design literature to be highly inefficient, and so complex fee estimation algorithms are required, and even these algorithms often end up not working very well, leading to frequent fee overpayment. See also https://blog.bitgo.com/the-challenges-of-bitcoin-transaction-fee-estimation-e47a64a61c72 for a Bitcoin core developer's description of the challenges involved in fee estimation in the status quo. Instability of blockchains with no block reward: in the long run, blockchains where there is no issuance (including Bitcoin and Zcash) at present intend to switch to rewarding miners entirely through transaction fees. However, there are known results showing that this likely leads to a lot of instability, incentivizing mining "sister blocks" that steal transaction fees, opening up much stronger selfish mining attack vectors, and more. There is at present no good mitigation for this. EIP 1559 has these benefits: It mitigates the economic inefficiencies from social cost mismatch due to fee volatility. There is a fairly nuanced economic argument here; see particularly pages 16-20 of the paper linked in https://ethresear.ch/t/draft-position-paper-on-resource-pricing/2838 (though I recommend reading the whole paper) for a detailed argument of why this is the case. Intuitively, the adjusting fee mechanism works like a fixed fee in the short run and a cap in the long run, and it turns out that because of arguments from Martin Weitzman's 1974 paper fixed fees are likely better than a cap in the circumstances that basically all public blockchains are in today and will likely continue to be in. It replaces the auction with a fixed price sale (except during short periods where blocks fill up completely until fees catch up), eliminating first-price-auction inefficiencies and making fee estimation extremely simple: calculate the fee f for the next block, if you can afford it pay it, otherwise don't. It creates a mechanism similar to a permanent block reward (the 1/N coming from the pot), mitigating many of the instability issues with fee-only blockchains without requiring actual permanent issuance. Another underrated benefit of EIP 1559 is that it makes gas prices securely measurable. Today, just looking at gas prices on chain and using them as an index is exploitable, because miners could include either very-low-fee or very-high-fee dummy transactions where the fee would go to themselves. But under EIP 1559, the BASEFEE can only be manipulated at high cost, as dummy transactions would requre even the miner to pay fees (that get burned). Are current fee markets really that inefficient? Yes. The difference between average gasprice and 10th percentile gasprice in a regular block is something like 3x for median and 5-8x for mean. People needlessly overpay massively. Everyone who does not overpay suffers a delay of 1-2 minutes or even longer, and this delay does not actually benefit anyone; the total load to the chain is the same regardless of whether a given unit of load hits the chain at time N or time N + 60. There is no actual social benefit from participants "expressing a low time preference" in the fee market mechanism, at least under normal conditions; it is pure deadweight loss. We would all be better off if more transactions were just included immediately, which EIP 1559 allows. Why not just use a second price(or kth price auction) to solve the first-price-auction inefficiencies? Kth-price auctions (where everyone pays a gasprice equal to the lowest gasprice that was included in the block) are indeed "efficient" in a traditional economic analysis*, but have the flaw that they are vulnerable to collusion. Yes of course technically you want to use the highest gasprice not included in the block; but in practice given that most ethereum blocks have hundreds of transactions the difference would be negligible. Might EIP 1559 run the risk of over-stressing nodes and miners during periods of high usage? EIP 1559 can at most increase block size by 2x, even in the short term. Each "full block" (ie. a block whose gas is 2x the TARGET) increases the BASEFEE by 1.125x, so a series of constant full blocks will increase the gas price by a factor of 10 every ~20 blocks (~4.3 min on average). Hence, periods of heavy on-chain load will not realistically last longer than ~5 minutes. Note that currently, periods of double load that last 5 minutes already happen by random chance roughly once per ~63888 blocks (~10 days) because of variance in the rate of block production. So the introduction of EIP 1559 would not bring in any unprecedented level of load to the system. Additionally, the gas limit being only 10 million and not higher is justified to a large extent not by hard network limits (uncle rates are near historic lows, though risks to non-miner nodes such as bootstrap nodes, may be higher), but by concerns that are fundamentally long-term in character: Centralization risk of somewhat higher uncle rates: if uncle rates shoot up to 20%, that would disproportionately benefit well-connected large pools Limits to state size Difficulty of syncing after a short period offline In all three of these cases, what matters is not the upper bound on capacity within a very short window of time, but rather the long-term average capacity. Uncle rates being 2% during odd hours and 18% during even hours would have the same effect on all three of the above, as uncle rates always being 10%. Because EIP 1559 still bounds the long-run gas usage to a ~10 million per block average, it does not affect the long-term average. How would a spike of high usage look like under EIP 1559 compared to the status quo? Consider a "mathematically ideal spike" (eg. this could happen in real life because of a sudden market event leading to many arbitrage opportunities on DEXes, bidding on liquidated CDPs, etc), where N * 10 million gas worth of transactions, each with a very very high gasprice, are all broadcasted. Currently, this would lead to the following situation: The next N blocks are filled exclusively with new spiky transactions After that other transactions, as well as transactions that people send after the spike, get included in descending order of gasprice An average "normal user" would have to wait more than N blocks. Now, consider the situation under EIP 1559: The next N/2 blocks are filled exclusively with new spiky transactions, each with twice the normal amount of gas If all other transactions get sent with a gas price cap equal to the old gasprice, then the next N/2 blocks would be empty, and after that things would revert to normal. But realistically, higher-priority transactions would set higher gas price caps and get included first, and other transactions later. An average "normal user" would have to wait somewhere between N/2 and more than N blocks. Hence, even including the post-spike "recovery period" during which block capacity would be smaller than normal, most transactions get included sooner. Here's a very rough simulation (there are lots of strange assumptions here, but modeling a full system that covers both supply/demand curves and waiting times is hard); spreadsheet source here. Status quo: (https://storage.googleapis.com/ethereum-hackmd/upload_3275cf10d6874f0837b08b17160231ee.png) EIP 1559: (https://storage.googleapis.com/ethereum-hackmd/upload_a5b82e76e3e6820dbd6e1d117f034e17.png) What would EIP 1559 do under larger and more prolonged spikes (eg. day-long spikes) Not much. The BASEFEE would rise and there would be a short period at the beginning where a few transactions get in faster, but after that the fee market would function just as it would under "ordinary" conditions, just at a higher fee level. The main benefit of EIP 1559 in spikes is that the harms from inefficiency of regular fee markets are magnified when fees are high, so having a functioning fee market becomes more important. If the chain can handle 2x block size spikes, doesn't that mean the chain can handle just making all blocks 2x larger? No. See this post for why: https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/eip_1559_spikes Why limit = target * 2? Why not 4? Or 8? It could easily be higher than 2. The higher the limit/target ratio the greater the fee market efficiency benefits of EIP 1559. It depends on how severe the short term spikes are that we are willing to accept; 2x is fairly conservative. We could even launch EIP 1559 with a limit/target of 2 to start off, and increase it over time as we see the network functioning okay even under short-term spikes. Why would miners include transactions at all? The EIP includes a "tip" that transaction senders can include, that goes to the miner. The tip has two functions: first, if there are suddenly far more transactions than expected, miners will include transactions with higher tips first, so the fee-based prioritization mechanism exists as a backup. Second, it compensates miners for uncle risk (the increased risk their block will not be included in the main chain because adding one more transaction will slow it down). The tip level that compensates for uncle risk has been calculated to be about 0.8 gwei (uncle blocks get on average a 1.67 ETH reward instead of the 2 ETH base, so that's a ~0.33 ETH = 330m gwei loss, 10 million gas blocks add ~0.025 to the uncle rate ckompared to empty blocks, so the expected cost of 1 gas is = 330m / 10m * 0.025 = 0.825 gwei) and miners do actually set about this value when the chain is empty. This tip level is independent of the BASEFEE, so client implementations can confidently set 1-1.5 gwei and expect their transactions to be accepted. How might wallets choose tips? Is there a risk of bidding wars for tips? Wallets could simply choose tips by looking at what tips have been accepted on chain historically, and increasing their tip if they see that a transaction they send was not accepted immediately. Note that in "normal conditions" there is no incentive to set a tip higher than the bare minimum. In cases of sudden congestion, tips do degrade into a bidding war; wallets can detect congestion, and in this case they could offer users the option of setting low or high priority for their transaction. What is the escalator mechanism? How might the escalator mechanism be combined with EIP 1559? The escalator mechanism is a different proposed transaction fee reform, where instead of specifying a single fee, users specify their fee as a function, usually with a beginning, an increase-per-block and a maximum, for example "5 gwei if this transaction is included in block 10123456, add 1 gwei for every block after that (eg. 8 gwei if included in block 10123459), up to a maximum of 100 gwei". This would be four parameters: beginning fee, beginning block, per-block increment, max fee. The goal is to be "safer" against mistakes in fee estimation, as if the fee turns out to be too low it would naturally rise over time until the transaction is included. In an EIP 1559 context, this could be used to set the tip. The fact that the tip would generally be in a constant range means that even a wallet using fixed parameters for the escalator would deliver reasonably good outcomes to users. Won't miners have the incentive to collude to push down the BASEFEE by making all their blocks less than half full? In general, the effectiveness of such strategies is limited, because unless truly almost everyone colludes, a transaction not included in one block will get included will just get included in the next block and so the effect of this action on the long-run BASEFEE will be negligible. However, what miners can do is a kind of "monopoly pricing". Suppose transaction senders are willing to pay some extra fee to avoid getting delayed one block. Miners can refuse to include transactions that do not include some minimum tip T; they lose out on some fee revenue, but gain from senders increasing their fees if they value the extra probability you will be the next miner and include their transaction highly enough. This strategy is heavily tilted against the miner: they suffer the full cost of lost fee revenue, but gain only a small portion of the increased transaction fees that others send. Note that even if a miner using such a strategy is successful, they will increase other miners' revenue more than it will increase their own revenue (as other miners free-ride on the higher tips due to your actions), so it is not a centralization vector. This will not reduce BASEFEEs down to zero; rather, it will hit an equilibrium where BASEFEEs remain the bulk of the fee and tips take up the remainder. This is because unless miners are all colluding (in which case we have bigger problems), miners suffer the entire cost of not including transactions but gain only some of the benefit of tips being higher. If the risk of miners deploying such a strategy is still deemed unacceptably high, we can direct some (eg. 50%) of the revenue from EIP 1559 into a pool from which a small percentage is drained every block to be added to the miners' block reward; this ensures miners benefit from the BASEFEE being high, further reducing the gains from such an attack. Here is a proposed sketch of a change to the EIP to do this: Define the account 0x35 as FEE_SMOOTHING_BUFFER, and define FEE_SMOOTHING_CONSTANT = 8192 Add an additional term to the block reward (added at the same time as the base block reward and uncle+nephew rewards). Let smoothing_reward = FEE_SMOOTHING_BUFFER.balance // FEE_SMOOTHING_CONSTANT. Transfer smoothing_reward wei from FEE_SMOOTHING_BUFFER to block.coinbase After applying the block rewards, 1/2 of EIP-1559 fees from that block (rounding down) get added to FEE_SMOOTHING_BUFFER's balance. The remainder (ie. 1/2 rounding up) gets burned. Note that in a proof of stake context, it would be desirable to implement secret leader elections along with penalties for early revelation, to prevent validators from acquiring reputations as only accepting high tips and gaining the entire benefit of this themselves as transaction senders would know which validators are creating blocks soon. Other resources The original paper: https://ethresear.ch/t/first-and-second-price-auctions-and-improved-transaction-fee-markets/2410 ethresear.ch thread on Barnabe's simulations: https://ethresear.ch/t/eip-1559-simulations/7280 Tim Roughgarden's report: http://timroughgarden.org/papers/eip1559.pdf submitted by /u/c-i-s-c-o [link] [comments]

Here on Valentine's day wishing EIP-1559 goes through seamlessly �� Posted: 14 Feb 2021 05:27 AM PST Been an ETh holder since 2017. Seen this ecosystem blossom. I'm not the tech savvy type, been reading all sort of conflicting things about this improvement proposal. I hope all involved realize how crucial this upgrade is to the continued growth of this beautiful ecosystem. It's in the interest of all- miners, devs, users that this proposal sails through. Let's all think long term here To the continued success of Ethereum 🎉 submitted by /u/northernedge24 [link] [comments]

Mining Ethereum with Xbox Series X using UWP? Posted: 14 Feb 2021 11:52 AM PST I had an idea about mining with consoles. I know that's not possible in PlayStation. But Xbox gives UWP support. So I thought can I use GPU for mining. I know the Xbox's GPU is AMD's APU. So I thought I can use OpenCL to mine Ethereum. What do you think about that? Is it possible? I'm planning to implement ethminer to the UWP app. https://github.com/ethereum-mining/ethminer submitted by /u/caseyler [link] [comments]

It's time to talk about the Ethereum's art Posted: 14 Feb 2021 04:00 PM PST Ok guys, there's sometime that I'm reading and doing some research in ethereum and I just love the arts that I see in the ethereum.org site. I am a great fan of Moebius work and I can see that there's a lot of inspiration from Jean Giraud's works there. Made some googling and also looked at this forum but couldn't find something about those drawings, et cetera. Could someone tell me a bit more about it, who did it, etc? ​ see ya at 2.0! :) submitted by /u/mathmagick [link] [comments]

Is there a chance that EIP 1559 never comes out as mining pools are all strongly against it? Posted: 14 Feb 2021 05:00 AM PST As we all know, miners are loving the expensive fees because they get to make more money and despite EIP 1559 being a huge improvement, miners are voting against it. Is there a possibility that this EIP will just be rejected? submitted by /u/_bush [link] [comments]

Interested in this concept, but I'm stupid. Please help explain defi borrowing to an idiot. Posted: 14 Feb 2021 05:37 PM PST I'm cross posting this for more responses. I'm fascinated by the world of Defi lending/borrowing. My portfolio is almost exclusively Defi. I'm trying to learn everything about it. I understand the concepts and advantages to LENDING on platforms like AAVE. But I'd like to understand why someone would borrow? I get the concept of borrowing to move into other coin positions. But let me lay out an example that confuses me: AAVE says borrowers most frequently borrow for "unexpected emergencies." So lets say Jimmy needs 6000 bucks for an emergency. He has a bit more than 6000 bucks in ETH. Let's say ETH is at 2k and he borrows 3 ETH to be 6,000USD. He has to pay back 3 ETH +interest, right? So no matter where the price is, he's paying 3 ETH. Whether 3 ETH is 2k a coin or 10k a coin. So where is the advantage? You're losing 3ETH whether it's from your current stash or if you buy more ETH to cover it. No matter what the situation, how wouldn't it be better just to sell and get your money, and buy back ETH on your own time to fill back up your bag if that's the concern? You may need to explain like you're talking to a child, because I'm quite confused. submitted by /u/Holbrecht [link] [comments]

A Theory of Ethereum State Size Management Posted: 14 Feb 2021 03:00 PM PST submitted by /u/ligi [link] [comments]

Can someone explain ETH 2.0 and when it is coming? Posted: 14 Feb 2021 05:12 PM PST I've heard about It and I'm a bit confused. Is it already happening? Is it and instant process? What will it do? Any help is great submitted by /u/tyzy_1187 [link] [comments]

On Ethereum's Dominance - Consolidated Common Content from Contributors Posted: 14 Feb 2021 06:37 AM PST Consolidated/paraphrased from various amazing contributors - this is not advice, but observation - If Passing On, No Need for Attribution, just happy to help as others have helped me Ethereum does much more than Bitcoin (not trashing papa Bitcoin, but Ethereum does more. Much Much more). This may not be bad. Being more conservative, less innovative, has perks. There's plenty of discussion on this theme I'll mention below. Ethereum's network effects as the dominant smart contract platform are overwhelming. All the things that make smart-blockchains cool are being done on Ethereum. There's no serious competition anymore; the evidence overwhelming: Ethereum's momentum as the primary platform where crypto-assets are issued has grown over the last three years, with the share of the total token market cap constituted by Ethereum based tokens rising from 73.81% in July 2017, to 98.40% in July 2020 (source). The entire market has steadily converged on Ethereum as the settlement layer for crypto-assets and Ethereum's ERC20 token interface as its technology standard for digital assets. Ethereum is the most utilized crypto platform in the world, with more fees being paid to Ethereum miners than any other project's. The dominance extends beyond just Ethereum, to Ethereum-based dApps, with seven of the next nine largest revenue earning crypto projects in the world being based on Ethereum, as this charts shows with all the projects highlighted in pink being Ethereum-based: https://cryptofees.info All major DeFi applications operate on Ethereum. Tracked by DefiPulse. These DeFi apps are all interacting to create an increasingly sophisticated open financial system on Ethereum that gives the platform an increasingly insurmountable advantage over potential competitors. All of the major stablecoins; Tether (USDT), USD Coin (USDC), True USD (TUSD), Binance USD (BUSD), and Paxos Standard (PAX), use the ERC20 standard. Beyond market adoption, the Ethereum development community is by far the largest in the cryptocurrency space, and its advantage over all other smart contract platforms has rapidly grown over the last three years: Ethereum has an overwhelming lead over all other cryptocurrency and blockchain projects in the number of developers working on it according to the recently released Electric Capital Developer Report (2020). This lead is accelerating, with a 215% increase in the number of developers working on Ethereum since 2017, and with the number of monthly developers increasing by 300+ between Q3 2019 and Q3 2020, which bucked the downward trend seen in the rest of the cryptocurrency market. (source) The overwhelming majority of Research and Development on blockchain scalability is being done on Ethereum-based projects (source). Groundbreaking scalability solutions that have recently launched on Ethereum Mainnet include Loopring and zkSync, which use zkRollUp technology to enable thousands of transactions per second to be processed on Ethereum layer 1: (source) The misinformation you'll hear too much Ethereum's developer tool list outshines everything out there. Getting smart contract to work properly is complex, and there is no magic port that will can do that realistically (no matter what others might shill). These are years of tools from thousands of developers. Having smart contract functionality means little compared to the tool list needed to use it effectively. Every other project still needs years to have all these tools, for what? A blockchain that has some trivial perk (assuming it's a perk). By the time they have these tools (years away) ETH 2.0 and a whole new paradigm of functionally will be in place. Again, there are thousands and thousand of ethereum developers, no other project comes close. Note, there's some that think moving tokens (ERC20) from one blockchain to another is a big deal. It's not. There are no simple converters for the broader blockchain functionality. This is not a push button process. An ERC20 token is not the real world application being converted, it's just a simple token. Nothing special. ETH 2.0 model outshines all in the areas of decentralization. There's a lot of discussion about types of "Proof-of-Stake" (a validation method of the blockchain ledger). ETH 2.0 allows individuals to stake (validate) the ledger. Projects that claim to be cheaper/faster use delegators (cartels), often calling their method "Delegated" or "Dynamic" Proof-of-Stake (or other names), which essentially forces control of the chain in to groups, so for example, exchanges could assume control. ETH 2.0 stakers can opt in to join pools, but pools are not required. Got 32 ETH? You can stake as a individual. Ethereum's supply (and other common new-person questions about ethereum) ETH is not capped, but restricted, capped is unlikely to be secure. Ethereum's monetary policy is best described as "minimum issuance to secure the network" ETH issuance and burn is more sophisticated than Bitcoin. Under EIP-1559, some ETH get's burned (removed), which is projected to be greater than issuance (created). Everything is about creating a stable network, rather than and arbitrary cap. Bitcoin IS inflationary, and will be until we're all dead. Ethereum has a true deflationary mechanism What I see - anyone saying that ETH isn't scarce or anyone saying a "hard cap" is healthy for blockchains: doesn't understand math and securing blockchain systems is purposely deceitful trying to pitch their corpo-coin You might hear someone say "immutable" or "code is law" or similar topics, in references to Ethereum's early history. Young blockchains are technologies that often have issues that need sorted out to build trust. Bitcoin had a really bad event that had to be fixed (lots of bitcoins were generated by an exploit). But it got repaired. Ethereum had a similar event, and some will try to split hairs about how Ethereum's event was different. In the end, blockchains require trust or they will not be validated. In the end, Ethereum has garnered that trust, by devs, by investors, and just starting, industry. What about "eth-killer" (enter whatever) doing such and such? The graveyard of "eth-killers" is VAST: ICX. QTUM. VET. ZIL. EOS. ONT. XTZ. IOTA. NEO. STRAT. AION, Rootstock, ETC (to name a few). We have a new wave of them now. My advice. Stop pretending you can "kill" Ethereum and starting thinking how you can contribute to the world Ethereum is creating. But the gas-fees are too high... Yes, they are. Because the chain is being used. But L2 (above chain) solutions are already out (an example) for developers to start using. Plus other updates coming in a few months, such as EIP-1559, clients... this summer. FUDing gas costs now is justified, but don't think untested/unused projects have any edge, especially with upgrades on a functioning chain (Ethereum) are already here, with more coming. More opinion, not advice The order of importance is Ethereum, Bitcoin than any of the players trying to innovate the space, which are overwhelmingly building on Ethereum. I no longer see any other independent blockchain as relevant compared to Ethereum. I did a few years ago, but many of those projects failed their vision, some disappointed greatly Ethereum 2.0 will easily cover my prior concerns. So to me, it's done - if blockchains have a future, it's Ethereum's future. (mostly) I do see plenty of interesting defi projects (on Ethereum, of course). They are all MUCH higher risk than Ethereum. itself. I have a minority opinion, it seems Bitcoin is irrelevant compared to Ethereum. It's more just name recognition. Ethereum already does more than Bitcoin, including more transactions, but that's not the reason I see Bitcoin as irrelevant The major valid argument supporting Bitcoin (compared to ETH) is that it is a simple blockchain. It remains a powerful upgrade to gold, a better store of value. Ethereum, while more capable, involves innovations, which adds potential risks. AND ETH 2.0 is not fully here yet I do, somewhat, agree with the above argument, in the short term, but if ETH 2.0 works (and it seems it will) and it fully becomes a computer-ledger for the world (a bigger "what if" for all crypto), then ETH becomes a more fundamental resource to society than Bitcoin. ETH, then, is a better store of value. Bitcoin is irrelevant. Working together - I see it. Other chains will still be around in a couple of years. But to dethrone Ethereum, you need to do something absolutely unexpected, like turning a phone into a camera. Turning gold digital. Turning digital gold into an app store (Ethereum). What's next? Something HUGE, I suspect some day, but NOTHING I see now in this space is anything other than just a shadow/subordinate of Ethereum (in my opinion). submitted by /u/nbr1bonehead [link] [comments]

What’s New in Eth2 - 13 February 2021 -- Edition 62 Posted: 14 Feb 2021 07:43 AM PST submitted by /u/twigwam [link] [comments]

Ethereum fees Posted: 14 Feb 2021 05:35 PM PST Everything surrounding ethereum seems to be positive except the fees. What fees are we talking about here and why can't we just reduce them if its such a drastic factor in ethereums future? I'm a bit of a noob so go easy. submitted by /u/bagsderifurlookin [link] [comments]

Ethereum desktop wallets Posted: 14 Feb 2021 06:59 PM PST What is the most secure and fully open source ethereum wallet for Linux (Debian), especially if it is something that is not web based and that it is light like electrum submitted by /u/joseluisrojas21 [link] [comments]

Flashloan arbitrage between Uniswap & Sushiswap | Full tutorial with Solidity code Posted: 14 Feb 2021 04:07 AM PST submitted by /u/jklepatch [link] [comments]

Music producers & DJs Teddy Killerz launches their NFT token on OpenSea Posted: 14 Feb 2021 05:47 PM PST https://opensea.io/collection/teddy-killerz submitted by /u/garudtk [link] [comments]

I’m a newbie Posted: 14 Feb 2021 08:45 AM PST Hello, I'm an apprentice truck technician and I am looking at ways to invest some of the money I am currently saving since I am not buying a car right now. How much should I put into Ethereum at the end of the month. Was looking at putting £50-£100 for my first investment with the Crypto.com app. Any help and advice would be greatly appreciated. (PS I have been saving money since I started working at the age of 15 and feel like I need to put some of it to good use.) submitted by /u/jackneilson4 [link] [comments]

New To Cryptocurrency. Questions Please Posted: 14 Feb 2021 12:39 AM PST I understand when you buy BITCOIN its buying the whole coin at market value or a partial buy to get a % of the coin. Now is Ethereum the same concept? Either buy the current price for a coin around the 1800 or just put some money in it and get a partial of the coin? Thanks! submitted by /u/Bretonc7 [link] [comments]

The liquidity pool agnostic provider proposal Posted: 14 Feb 2021 03:22 PM PST It is a way to provide liquity to a pool using only one token: https://heymakio.medium.com/the-liquidity-pool-agnostic-provider-proposal-7fa35bf76ea7 Let me know what you think about. submitted by /u/mkiob [link] [comments]

Layer 2 solutions technical question Posted: 14 Feb 2021 10:11 AM PST Can someone explain (in simple words) what is the difference between implementing some layer 2 solution versus using other chain like e.g. Polkadot or Nano, to offload some operations and then just sync the effect with Ethereum? submitted by /u/witoldsz [link] [comments]

NFT platform for recording artist and beat producers Posted: 14 Feb 2021 05:38 PM PST Does anyone know if there are any NFT platforms for producers or independent recording artists? submitted by /u/treezonfire_ [link] [comments]

ETH gas price increase the price of the coin? Posted: 14 Feb 2021 04:28 PM PST Hi - I transferred a small amount of ETH from Coinbase to Exodus, and I noticed that the price per coin changed to a higher amount once I transferred it to Exodus. Is that an error, or is that how the gas fees work? submitted by /u/FineJeez- [link] [comments]

Ethereum stuck on splash screen Posted: 14 Feb 2021 06:26 AM PST Hi, I'm stuck on the splash screen. It look like a circle running in loop. This is what shows up in the logs: [2021-02-14T14:20:05.785] [INFO] EthereumNode - 3000ms elapsed, assuming node started up successfully [2021-02-14T14:20:05.785] [INFO] EthereumNode - Started node successfully: geth main fast [2021-02-14T14:20:05.787] [INFO] Sockets/node-ipc - Connect to {"path":"\\\\.\\pipe\\geth.ipc"} [2021-02-14T14:20:05.788] [INFO] Sockets/node-ipc - Connected! [2021-02-14T14:20:05.788] [INFO] Sockets/3 - Connect to {"path":"\\\\.\\pipe\\geth.ipc"} [2021-02-14T14:20:05.789] [INFO] Sockets/2 - Connect to {"path":"\\\\.\\pipe\\geth.ipc"} [2021-02-14T14:20:05.789] [INFO] Sockets/3 - Connected! [2021-02-14T14:20:05.789] [INFO] Sockets/2 - Connected! [2021-02-14T14:20:06.986] [INFO] EthereumNode - INFO [02-14|14:20:06.985] New local node record seq=34 id=b63c92b6fd7ef5e3 ip=94.4.211.37 udp=30303 tcp=30303 I had a look on the faqs and forums and I found a few other people having the same problem but no solutions that work for me - for example here and here. Any suggestions? thanks! submitted by /u/giruzz [link] [comments]

When will gas fees be solved? Posted: 13 Feb 2021 08:47 PM PST Im relatively new to crypto this cycle, hold some Ethereum and am trying to understand when gas fees will go down. As it is concerning that they are getting so high and the bull market has only started. Ive heard about all the solutions coming up eth2.0 which seems to far away eip1559 some time later this year? , second layer solutions already deployed? why are fees not going down yet? Thank you to anyone providing useful answers (: submitted by /u/honkydonky9 [link] [comments]

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