Cryptography Rumor has it that RedPhone's voice compression and encryption allowed eavesdropping of some or all of the call's contents. If this is true is there any perceived rollover to Signal's voice calling feature?

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• Rumor has it that RedPhone's voice compression and encryption allowed eavesdropping of some or all of the call's contents. If this is true is there any perceived rollover to Signal's voice calling feature?
• Expectations of a crypto API
• Specific vulnearble IV for WEP
• Is this password storage scheme any good
• Changing P & Q in Dual_EC_DRBG ?

Rumor has it that RedPhone's voice compression and encryption allowed eavesdropping of some or all of the call's contents. If this is true is there any perceived rollover to Signal's voice calling feature? Posted: 27 Feb 2018 08:23 AM PST submitted by /u/PseudoSecuritay [link] [comments]

Expectations of a crypto API Posted: 27 Feb 2018 11:08 AM PST Hello r/crypto! I am a free time developer, with a passion for cryptography. This is a question to my fellow developers; and cryptographers. I am wondering, what expectations and wishes do you have for a crypto API? As I want to create one, open source and in the language Crystal if anyone is interested in helping out. submitted by /u/Jens0512 [link] [comments]

Specific vulnearble IV for WEP Posted: 27 Feb 2018 07:24 PM PST I'm trying to understand how the FMS attack works on WEP, the wikipedia article states that the IV must be in a specif form, namely, (A+3, N-1, X), why is that? Why can't we just use any IV? submitted by /u/__yerT__ [link] [comments]

Is this password storage scheme any good Posted: 27 Feb 2018 11:58 AM PST So, making a password storage scheme for the server of a program I'm developing. I'm wondering if this scheme has decent security and such. It's a python script with two functions. The first one takes a password and outputs an argon2 hash along with an addition custom salt. The second, verify takes a salt, hash and a password and if everything matches up will return true and if not, false. The source code can be found here submitted by /u/ExplosG [link] [comments]

Changing P & Q in Dual_EC_DRBG ? Posted: 27 Feb 2018 10:23 AM PST Is it possible (and if yes how) to change suspicious backdoor default P and Q values in Dual_EC_DRBG? And if that's not going to work is it possible to still use modern Elliptic Curve crypto in GPG/OpenSSL with some other RNG? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nybVFJVXbww&t=8m47s submitted by /u/P-e-t-a-r [link] [comments]

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